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Abstract
Background: Though past studies have shown wide variation in aggregate hospital price indices and specific procedures,
few have documented or explained such variation for distinct and common episodes of care.
Objectives: We sought to examine the variability in charges for percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) with a drug-
eluting stent and without major complications (MS-DRG-247), and determine whether hospital and market characteristics
influenced these charges.
Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of adults admitted to California hospitals in 2011 for MS-DRG-247 using
patient discharge data from the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development. We used a two-part linear
regression model to first estimate hospital-specific charges adjusted for patient characteristics, and then examine whether
the between-hospital variation in those estimated charges was explained by hospital and market characteristics.
Results: Adjusted charges for the average California patient admitted for uncomplicated PCI ranged from $22,047 to
$165,386 (median: $88,350) depending on which hospital the patient visited. Hospitals in areas with the highest cost of
living, those in rural areas, and those with more Medicare patients had higher charges, while government-owned hospitals
charged less. Overall, our model explained 43% of the variation in adjusted charges. Estimated discounted prices paid by
private insurers ranged from $3,421 to $80,903 (median: $28,571).
Conclusions: Charges and estimated discounted prices vary widely between hospitals for the average California patient
undergoing PCI without major complications, a common and relatively homogeneous episode of care. Though observable
hospital characteristics account for some of this variation, the majority remains unexplained.
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Introduction
Cost opacity for health care services has been proposed as one
explanation for continually escalating health care costs. Most
commercial markets guarantee customers relatively easy access to
accurate information about the cost of services, thus enabling
consumption to be tied to value. The health care marketplace,
however, does not offer this transparency to patients or payers, a
reality that leads to widespread variation in charges and prices
[1,2,3,4].
Past research attempting to explain the degree and sources of
provider-level charge and price variation has generally focused on
aggregate price indexes. [5,6] However, creating indexes requires
aggregating wide ranges of diagnoses and procedures. Charges for
specific episodes of care, on the other hand, while not exactly the
same should have less patient level variation and therefore more
validity when evaluating between-hospital differences in charges
and prices. [7] Further, the variation in charge for common
episodes of care is of more use from a consumer perspective when
deciding which hospital to visit for a specific complaint or
procedure.
For instance, percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) with a
drug eluting stent is one of the leading surgical reasons for
hospitalization in the United States [8] and one of the top ten
contributors to healthcare costs, totaling over $18 billion in
charges and over $5 billion in estimated costs in 2011. [9]
Uncomplicated PCI with a drug eluting stent is a relatively
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standard procedure, involving only minor variation between
patients. As a result, hospital charges for uncomplicated PCI with
a drug-eluting stent (Medical Severity Diagnosis Related Group
[MS-DRG] 247) should be fairly uniform in a competitive market,
and any observed variation in charges is unlikely to result from
different treatment choices. For this reason, uncomplicated PCI is
an interesting condition for which to isolate and analyze hospital-
level variation in charges and discounted prices.
We therefore conducted a cross-sectional analysis of patients
admitted to California hospitals for PCI with a drug eluting stent,
without major complications (MS-DRG 247) in 2011. Using a
two-part linear regression model, we first predicted charges at each
hospital after adjusting for patient characteristics. We then
assessed the variation in these adjusted charges for the average
California patient at each hospital, and used them as the
dependent variable in a second regression, in which we assessed
whether hospital and market-level factors could explain some of
the between-hospital variation in charges. Finally, we calculated
the variation in estimated discounted prices paid by private
insurers. We hypothesized that variation in charges for PCI would
be small after accounting for hospital and market characteristics,
and that numerous institutional covariates would be associated
with hospital charges for uncomplicated PCI.
Methods
Data Sources
To capture admissions for uncomplicated PCI, we used the
2011 publicly available Patient Discharge Database from the
California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
(OSHPD). This dataset captures demographic and clinical data as
well as reported charges for all admissions to non-federal hospitals
in California, excluding those operated by Kaiser Permanente (a
large managed care organization in California), which are not
required to report charges to OSHPD. In this public dataset,
OSHPD masks selective patient information pursuant to the
California Health Data and Advisory Council Consolidation Act.
Because we used a public data source that was masked for
identifiers, our study was exempt from review by the Committee
on Human Research at the University of California, San
Francisco.
To capture hospital-level factors including each hospital’s
ownership, teaching status, rural/urban status, and number of
licensed beds, we used 2011 hospital financial and utilization files
available from OSHPD. [10] We then used the Area Resource
Files from the Health Resources and Services Administration to
measure each hospital market’s uninsured population and poverty
rates. [11] Finally, we used the Impact Files from the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to capture each hospital’s
wage index (cost of living) and case-mix index [12].
Sample Selection
We included data on all adult patients (18–64 years old)
admitted to a general acute care hospital for MS-DRG 247 – PCI
with a drug eluting stent, without major complications. We further
limited our sample to privately insured patients, as the discount
factor we later use to estimate discounted price only applies to
them. In an effort to maintain a homogeneous sample, we
excluded patients who died in the hospital and those who did not
have a routine discharge home. Patients with invalid charges,
charges exceeding the cell size limit, and those receiving charity
care were also excluded from the analysis. See Figure 1 for a full
description of our exclusions.
Outcomes
Our primary outcome was total hospital charges for an
admission for MS-DRG-247. These charges represent the total
amount billed by the hospital to the patient or his insurance for the
episode of care, excluding physician fees. Charges are calculated
using the full, established rates before any adjustments or pre-
payments.
As a secondary outcome, we examined estimated discounted
prices, which represent the amount hospitals actually receive for
the services they provide. We calculated this measure by
multiplying the charge by the hospital’s average discount rate for
all privately insured patients, as done in previous work. [6,13] The
average discount rate was calculated from the 2011 OSHPD
financial files as follows: (gross inpatient revenue + gross outpatient
revenue – contractual adjustments)/(gross inpatient revenue +
gross outpatient revenue) [13].
Patient Level Predictors
In adjusting charges for patient characteristics, we considered
patient age (,40, 40–44, 45–49, 50–54, 55–59, and 60–64 years
old), gender, Charlson comorbidity scores, Elixhauser comorbid-
ities (hypertension, diabetes without chronic complications,
diabetes with chronic complications, peripheral vascular disease,
chronic pulmonary disease, hypothyroidism, renal failure, anemia,
depression, and obesity), [14] insurance coverage (Knox-Keene/
Medi-Cal Organized Health System, other managed care, or
traditional private coverage), and length of stay as patient-level
predictors of charge. Length of stay is a right-skewed variable, and
to control for this, we log-transformed each value (length of stay+1)
[15].
Hospital and Market-Level Predictors
To look at hospital-level influences on charges, we included
variables for hospital ownership (for profit, non-profit, govern-
ment), teaching status, urban or rural location, volume (number of
licensed beds), patient payer mix (% Medicare, % Medicaid), wage
index (a measure of cost of living), and case-mix severity. We also
included two facility-level inpatient quality indicators from the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: acute myocardial
infarction (AMI) mortality rate, and heart failure mortality rate
[16].
We further included the percent of the population in the
hospital’s county that is uninsured, percent of the county in
poverty, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the
catchment area as market-level characteristics related to hospital
charges. The HHI is widely used as a measure of the level of
competition in an industry, and is defined as the sum of squares of
the market shares of all hospitals within the market, here defined
as all zip codes the hospital draws patients from. [17] It can range
from 0 to 10,000 (using whole percentages), and a higher index
signifies less competition. We calculated market shares directly
from our patient discharge data. We also accounted for hospitals’
membership in systems by calculating system-wide HHI because
hospital system membership can influence price setting [6].
Statistical Analysis
We used a two-part regression model for our analysis to
specifically assess between-hospital variation in charges for
uncomplicated PCI. First, we regressed the log of raw hospital
charges on the aforementioned patient clinical and demographic
characteristics that could affect the level of services provided.
Dummy variables for each hospital were included as fixed effects.
This model was used to predict the charge per average length of
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stay at each hospital for the average California patient with
uncomplicated PCI. We then descriptively analyzed these
predicted charges to assess the degree of between-hospital
variation in charges for uncomplicated PCI that is not driven by
differences in observable patient demographics or comorbidities.
In our second regression, we regressed the log of these predicted
charges on the hospital and market characteristics mentioned
above. The exponentiated coefficients from this model tell us if
and how hospital and market characteristics significantly predict
charges, as described in previous literature. [6,13,18] This second
regression also tells us what proportion of the variation we observe
between hospitals is explained by the observable hospital and
market characteristics in the model. All analyses were completed
using STATA version 11.0 (College Station, TX).
Results
Our final sample included 4,387 privately insured patients
admitted to one of 124 California hospitals for PCI with a drug
eluting stent and without major complications (MS-DRG-247) in
2011. The sample was 80% male, and 60% were between the ages
of 55 and 64. (Table 1). For 76% of the sample their length of stay
was shorter than 3 days, and 50% had a Charlson index of 1,
indicating serious but relatively simple admissions. Many patients
had comorbidities; 64% had hypertension, and almost 30% had
diabetes. Of the 124 hospitals, 71% were not-for-profit, 99% were
urban, and 15% were teaching hospitals (Table 2). Market
characteristics showed some variability; 60% of hospitals were in
Figure 1. Sample Selection. Flow chart of exclusions from the original starting sample of all adult ($18 years old) patients admitted for MS-DRG-
247 leading to the final 4,387 patients studied. Missing variables generally referred to masked items in the public dataset used to protect the identity
of patients. ‘‘No coordinates’’ indicates an inability to locate the hospital.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103829.g001
Table 1. Characteristics of patients in the study sample (n = 4,387).
Age categories N %
,40 years 86 2.0%
40–44 253 5.8%
45–49 498 11.4%
50–54 917 20.9%
55–59 1,223 27.9%
60–64 1,410 32.1%
Sex
Male 3,498 79.7%
Female 889 20.3%
Private Insurance Type
Managed Care-Knox Keene 1,952 44.5%
Managed Care-Other 2,070 47.2%
Traditional Coverage 365 8.3%
Charlson Index
0 1,031 23.5%
1 2,199 50.1%
2 1,157 26.4%
Length of Stay
,3 days 3,329 75.9%
3–6 days 1,032 23.5%
.6 days 26 0.6%
Elixhauser Comorbidities
Hypertension 2,818 64.2%
Diabetes w/o chronic complications 1,152 26.3%
Diabetes w/chronic complications 130 3.0%
Peripheral vascular disease 160 3.7%
Chronic pulmonary disease 313 7.1%
Hypothyroidism 246 5.6%
Renal failure 141 3.2%
Anemia 147 3.4%
Obesity 746 17.0%
Depression 178 4.1%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103829.t001
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markets with low cost of living, and 31% were in markets with a
low degree of competition.
Looking first at raw charges for an admission for PCI without
major complications, we found a median raw charge of $97,589.
These raw charges varied substantially, ranging from $20,056 to
$195,245. We then adjusted the raw charges for the patient’s
characteristics to predict adjusted charges for the average patient
with a hospital stay for PCI with a drug eluting stent and without
major complications at each hospital (see Table S1 for the results
of this first regression). Our predicted charges ranged from
$22,047 to $165,386 (median $88,350) depending on which
hospital the patient visited.
Many hospital and market attributes were significantly corre-
lated with these adjusted charges for PCI in the average patient
(Table 3). Our model revealed that government-owned hospitals
charged 28% less than not-for-profit hospitals, while rural
hospitals charged 36% more than urban hospitals. Hospitals
located in areas with the highest cost of living (wage index) had
39% higher adjusted charges than those in areas with the lowest
costs of living, and for each one percent increase in the proportion
of a hospital’s patients covered by Medicare, charges for PCI
without major complications increased by 0.7%. Overall, our
model explained 43% of the variation in adjusted charges
(R2= 0.4308).
Finally, we used the product of the predicted charges and
average estimated discount rates for each hospital to estimate what
price a private insurer would actually pay for PCI without major
complications. The calculated discounted prices for the average
patient at each hospital ranged from $3,421 to $80,903, with a
median discounted price of $28,571 – less than one third of the
median adjusted charge. Figure 2 shows the adjusted charges and
corresponding discounted prices for each hospital, demonstrating
that while the measures are correlated, charge is not a perfect
predictor of price.
Discussion
Our findings show that for the average California patient
admitted for PCI with a drug eluting stent and without major
complications in 2011, charges varied from $22,047 to $165,386
depending on the hospital he visited. This range only represents
between-hospital variation in charges, as the variation in raw
charges stemming from observable patient characteristics was
removed in our first-stage regression. We found that hospital and
market-level characteristics did help explain some of this between-
hospital variation in charges for uncomplicated PCI. For instance,
government hospitals charged less than not-for-profit hospitals.
Hospitals in markets with high costs of living charged more, as did
rural hospitals and hospitals with higher proportions of Medicare
patients. These findings are generally aligned with those of
previous literature studying broad price indices [6,18].
Table 2. Characteristics of California hospitals in sample (n = 124).
Ownership N %
Government 11 8.9%
Non-profit 89 71.8%
For-profit 24 19.4%
Location
Urban 123 99.2%
Rural 1 0.8%
Teaching Status
Yes 19 15.3%
No 105 84.7%
Wage Index (tertiles) N Mean SD
Low 75 1.20 0.007
Medium 8 1.22 0.011
High 41 1.54 0.108
Herfindal-Hirschman Index (tertiles)
Low 42 1304 476
Medium 43 3212 708
High 39 6475 2144
Casemix (severity – tertiles)
Low 42 1.52 0.08
Medium 41 1.68 0.04
High 41 1.88 0.16
% Without Insurance 124 18.1% 3.2%
% Below Federal Poverty Line 124 12.5% 3.1%
Licensed Beds 124 372 174
% Medicare 124 40.8% 11.2%
% Medicaid 124 23.3% 13.6%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103829.t002
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However, our model explained only 43% of the variation in
charges between hospitals, and relatively few predictors were
significant. The large proportion of variation that remained
unexplained could be due either to unobservable hospital or
market level factors, or to entirely random differences in hospital
charge levels.
Past literature indicates that much of the unexplained variation
we observe is likely unrelated to cost or hospital and market
characteristics. A MedPAC-funded national survey of hospital
financial administrators found that many chargemasters, from
which DRG charges are aggregated, are based on historical prices
that were calculated before costs of any given service could be
accurately estimated. [19] When setting and maintaining their
chargemasters today, most hospitals surveyed were concerned with
meeting regulations and maintaining their overall bottom line,
while only one third of hospitals interviewed reported any concern
over costs. [19] This is not surprising, as third party payments
from insurers are not based on costs, providing no incentive for
hospitals to consider costs when setting their charges. [20,21]
Simplistic ‘‘updates’’ that raise all charges by a uniform percentage
exacerbate the problem, as they aim to maintain the overall
solvency of the hospital and result in differential profitability of
services. [19,21,22] These practices prevent a substantial relation-
ship between charges and costs. Without this relationship, which is
present in most other competitive industries, there is no basis to
limit variation in charges between different hospitals. Our results
confirm the presence of unexplainable variation, and thus support
the documented absence of systematic charge setting in the
chargemaster system.
However inexplicable charges may be, they nevertheless can
have a tangible impact on patients and hospitals. Privately insured
patients seeking care out of network and the 22% of American
Table 3. The impact of hospital and market characteristics on adjusted charges.
% Increase in charges
for each unit change
in predictor
95% CI
lower bound
95% CI
upper bound p-value
HOSPITAL-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS
Ownership
Government 228.1% 244.6% 26.8% 0.013
Non-profit ref
For-profit 6.2% 26.8% 22.1% 0.371
Teaching Status
Yes 210.4% 229.5% 12.7% 0.346
No ref
MSA
Urban ref
Rural 36.3% 13.9% 63.2% 0.001
Volume
No. of licensed beds 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.118
Patient Mix
% Medicare 0.7% 0.0% 1.4% 0.048
% Medicaid 0.5% 20.1% 1.1% 0.136
Casemix (severity)
Medium 13.9% 20.4% 31.0% 0.057
High 12.7% 22.1% 28.9% 0.097
Wage Index
Medium 28.3% 215.5% 94.8% 0.239
High 38.5% 15.7% 65.7% 0.001
Quality Indicators
AMI mortality rate (%) 1.5% 21.7% 4.7% 0.365
Heart failure mortality rate (%) 5.2% 22.4% 10.9% 0.061
MARKET-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS
% Without Health Insurance 20.1% 22.4% 2.7% 0.915
% Below Federal Poverty Line 21.7% 25.6% 2.3% 0.404
Herfindal-Hirschman Index (System-wide)
Medium 22.1% 220.5% 20.7% 0.842
High 218.7% 234.5% 0.9% 0.06
Legend: In this second step of our two-part regression, we regressed hospital and market characteristics on the log of the adjusted average charges per length of stay at
each hospital generated from the first regression. The effects displayed here represent the impact the variable in question had on the hospital’s charge for the average
California patient. They are calculated as the difference between the exponentiated coefficients from the model and one, to show percent change.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103829.t003
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adults aged 19–64 who are uninsured may be billed the full charge
of their care. [23] Most charges are so high that patients cannot
pay them in full, which, without charity care or sliding-scale
income adjustment, can result in bad debt. [24,25] In part as a
result of this system, 57% of all American bankruptcies are related
to medical bills. [26] California’s Fair Pricing Act of 2006 has
significantly reduced the hardship of high hospital bills on
uninsured patients, and now 97% of California hospitals provide
free care to uninsured patients with incomes below 100% of the
federal poverty line. [27] The Affordable Care Act attempts to
implement similar fair pricing strategies nationwide, but the
provision applies only to non-profit hospitals and only specifies the
need to provide ‘‘financial assistance’’ for the uninsured, leaving
significant room for hospital interpretation and difficult enforce-
ment of meaningful changes [27].
Hospitals use charges regularly in calculating their uncompen-
sated care costs; 18–20% use the difference between charges and
payments by private insurers, and 50% use the difference between
charges and payments from the uninsured in these calculations.
[28] These amounts are then used to determine a hospital’s not-
for-profit, and hence tax-exempt status. [29] In addition, Medicare
sets their relative DRG weights and identifies qualifying outlier
payments using the product of charges and cost center level cost to
charge ratios. [30,31,32,33] Finally, many private insurers still
base their fee-for-service reimbursements off discounted charges,
and even insurers using prospective payment systems sometimes
use charges in benchmarking those payments [21,25].
In our secondary analysis, we found that estimated discounted
prices were, on average, approximately one third of the predicted
charge. They also showed significant variation across hospitals
(range: $3,421–$80,903). These discounts reflect the market power
of private insurance companies to negotiate discounted prices.
[34,35] For reference, CMS estimated that the average cost for
MS-DRG 247 was $13,014 per visit in 2012. [36] For consumers
who are billed their full charges, this difference between the
discounted price and actual charges has profound financial
implications. [37] This form of cost shifting actually penalizes
those individual consumers who have the least power in the system
and the lowest ability to pay [38].
Limitations
Our results should be interpreted in light of three major
limitations. First, because we used a DRG and not line-item
services (which were unavailable in our data) to classify an episode
of care for PCI with a drug eluting stent and without major
complications, it is likely that each patient had slightly different
intensity of utilization during their stay. Though we attempted to
minimize the impact of this limitation through our first regression
(that controlled for observable patient factors correlated with
intensity), there were likely unobservable confounding patient
Figure 2. Discounted prices versus adjusted charges, by hospital. Hospitals are placed in order along the x-axis by charge for the average
patient admitted for MS-DRG 247 (blue). The corresponding discounted price (estimated paid by a private insurer) is represented in red.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103829.g002
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characteristics that could have explained more of the variation in
charges at the individual level. However, as we used hospital-level
fixed effects in our first model, these differences should not affect
our second-step results unless the unobservable patient character-
istics are correlated with the hospital characteristics that we
included as regressors.
Second, the OSHPD data reports discount rates for privately
insured patients on an aggregate, hospital-level basis. However,
private payer reimbursements likely vary by insurer, DRG, and
department. We therefore recognize that our estimates of
discounted final prices are measured with error, and thus we
focus our regression analysis on charges, which are reported more
precisely in our data. However, past analyses have found that
insurers often broadly apply discount rates to wide ranges of
services, as the negotiated rates are aimed to maintain institutional
solvency. [39] In addition, there is significant precedent for
applying ratios to charges at the aggregate level; for example cost-
to-charge ratios applied directly to charges are used at an
aggregate level by CMS to estimate costs, and have been shown
to be imperfect but generally acceptable proxies for actual cost
[40].
Finally, it is important to note that our study is limited to
California, and though our results provide an interesting case
study of charge variation in a large and diverse state, they cannot
be generalized to the entire nation.
Conclusions
In 2011, the average California patient with a hospital stay for
PCI with a drug eluting stent who did not experience any major
complications could be charged between $22,047 and $165,386
(median $88,350) depending on which of 124 hospitals he visited.
Discounted prices paid by private insurers were, on average,
approximately one-third of the charges. Hospital ownership, share
of patients insured by Medicare, cost of living, and rural location
were correlated with charge rates. However, observable hospital
and market-level factors explained only 43% of the between-
hospital variation in charges. These findings demonstrate the wide
and largely unexplained variation in charges and prices for a
common and relatively homogeneous episode of care.
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Table S1 The impact of patient characteristics on raw
charges. In this first step of our two-part regression model, we
regressed multiple patient demographic and clinical characteristics
listed above, along with hospital fixed effects, on the log of raw
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cients from the model and one, to indicate percent change. This
regression not only generated the impact of patient characteristics
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average length of stay at each hospital.
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